John Sitilides opens with a data over dogma premise and a disclaimer that he speaks in a personal capacity. He frames the global system as a free and open maritime order that moves 90 percent of world commerce and most oil and LNG, a system now contested by China and, to a lesser degree, Russia. He argues China benefited most from this order after its WTO entry, yet seeks to upend it under the Chinese Communist Party’s centralized control.

He outlines three fronts. Trade: the Belt and Road Initiative exports China’s excess capacity and builds influence across the Global South, paired with debt leverage and expanded roles in international bodies. BRICS enlargement and Middle East diplomacy signal efforts to reduce dollar dependence. Technology: Made in China 2025 targets leadership in AI, quantum, robotics, EVs, and more, while China Standards 2035 aims to set global interoperability rules.

He contrasts Western openness with China’s surveillance model and warns of values embedded in technical standards. Taiwan: beyond invasion scenarios, he highlights a plausible blockade, the difficulty of breaking it, and the stakes around TSMC’s advanced chips, CCP legitimacy, and China’s power projection beyond the first island chain with anti-access missiles.

Turning to U.S. policy, he criticizes domestic decisions that raise energy costs and draw down the Strategic Petroleum Reserve while China fills its reserves. He cites long-term projections that oil and natural gas remain dominant, arguing the world is experiencing energy addition and diversification, not a full transition.

He points to Europe’s overreliance on Russian energy and Germany’s deindustrialization pressures as cautionary tales. He notes China’s push to dominate EV supply chains and critical minerals, warning against new strategic dependence. He closes by urging energy sovereignty, sustained U.S. production, and prudent defense and industrial policy to deter adversaries and preserve prosperity.

Speaking at Royal Fidelity in the Cayman Islands, John Sitilides opens with a warning that today’s geopolitical landscape is the most complex and dangerous since the end of the Cold War. He emphasizes that the globalization era of the 1990s has effectively ended, beginning with trends 15 years ago and accelerating with Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Sitilides frames global stability around maritime geography: 70 percent of the Earth is water, and 90 percent of trade flows by sea, including most oil and gas. The U.S.-led liberal order, safeguarded by American and allied navies, underpinned unprecedented prosperity until now. Russia and China now directly challenge this order.

He identifies Russia as a nuclear and commodity superpower with vast geography and global reach, pursuing revisionist aims. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine reflects a belief that Ukraine has no right to exist, a stance underpinned by nuclear threats, energy leverage, and historical claims. Sitilides underscores Europe’s overdependence on Russian gas, Angela Merkel’s strategic miscalculation, and NATO’s evolving role with Finland and Sweden’s accession. He cautions that sanctions are not global—major states like India, Brazil, and South Africa prioritize their own security and economic ties with Moscow.

China complements Russia with manufacturing might, pursuing Belt and Road infrastructure, influence in the Caribbean and Latin America, and ambitious technology programs like Made in China 2025 and Standards 2035. He stresses the geopolitical implications of Chinese investment and its effort to reshape global norms. He highlights tensions in the South China Sea, anti-access missile strategies, and Taiwan’s centrality to global semiconductors and U.S. security commitments.

Sitilides expands the view to Iran’s destabilizing role and nuclear ambitions, the risk of proliferation across the Middle East, and Europe’s renewed dependence on Gulf states for energy. He concludes with the global food security crisis tied to disrupted Ukrainian exports, warning of migration pressures in North Africa and the Middle East with potential spillovers to Europe. His closing call is for strategic clarity, renewed U.S. engagement in the Caribbean and Latin America, and preparedness for a multipolar world marked by sharper competition and fragile supply chains.